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1 Introduction 
In the economic literature, as well as in some sociological and 
anthropological studies, the discussion about formal and informal activities 
has often resembled that on dualistic socio-economic environments (e.g. 
Portes et al., 1989; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006; Jutting and De Laiglesia, 
2009; Kanbur, 2015), where some formal activities coming under the 
purview of the State coexist next to some activities falling outside it1. This 
notwithstanding, informality is not only a feature characterizing the early 
stages of development process but informal economic activities exist also in 
advanced countries (see, for instance, the evidence in Tanzi, 1999; Giles, 
1999; Schneider and Enste, 2000, 2013; Portes and Haller, 2005; Jutting and 
De Laiglesia, 2009; Schneider et al., 2010; Charmes, 2012; ILO, 2011; ILO-
WIEGO, 2013; Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams et al., 2015). 
Informal activities can be thought as the result of repeated interactions, 
occurring at any stage of development, between self-interested (even 
though not necessarily rational and optimizing) individuals and the State. 
There cannot be informality without: i) the presence of some formal 
institutions that, in the very first place, define the set of formal interactions 
(Lomnitz, 1988); ii) individuals who choose to conceal their economic 
activities. Far from being a platitude, this observation makes clear that the 
size and the features of informal economic activities in a country depend on 
the interaction between the features of the formal institutions in place and 
the individual’s incentives. 
Economists and sociologists have long investigated the relations between 
the size of the informal economy and several economic and social factors 
(see, for instance, Portes et al., 1989; Schneider and Enste, 2000, 2013; 
Maloney, 2004; Chen, 2006; Coletto, 2010; Andrews et al., 2011; Buehn and 
Schneider, 2012). Among the usual suspects, one can find income per capita 
and inequality (Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Bhattacharya, 2011), credit 
markets (Bose, 1998; Straub, 2005), urbanization dynamics (Yuki, 2007; Kar 
and Marjit, 2009), taxes, regulations, enforcement and other government 
policies (Friedman et al., 2000; Ihrig and Moe, 2004; Dabla-Norris et al., 
2008; Andrews et al., 2011; Prado, 2011), human capital endowments (La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2014), social welfare (Williams, 2014). High levels of 
taxes and regulatory burdens, in particular, have been often considered 
among the main determinants of the choice to undertake informal activities: 
those who feel overburdened by State interventionism, the reasoning goes, 
have an incentive to choose the “exit option” over the “voice option” (see 
                                                 
1 This is a central tenet of some fundamental studies, such as Boeke (1942, 1953), 
Hirschman (1957), Geertz (1963), Harris and Todaro (1970). 
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Hirschman, 1970; De Soto, 1989; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Kus, 2010; 
Prado, 2011). 
In spite of the fact that the relationship between the size of the informal 
economy and the levels of taxation and regulation, along with the 
complexity of the procedures necessary to abide by them, has become the 
object of abundant research (e.g. Loayza and Rigolini, 2006; Jutting and De 
Laiglesia, 2009; Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Kus, 2010; Andrews et al., 2011; 
Teobaldelli and Schneider, 2013; Williams, 2014, 2017; Adriaenssens and 
Hendrickx, 2015), little attention has been devoted to the role played by 
other important features of institutions and, in particular, their 
“extractiveness” (versus “inclusiveness”). 
Although the term “extractiveness” was originally used mainly to 
identify European colonizers exploiting the native population in colonized 
countries, more recently it has been used to characterize institutional 
systems where resources are surreptitiously diverted from the majority of 
the population towards a minority. In particular, as conceptualized by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), 
“extractiveness” refers to the features of institutions that affect citizens’ and 
firms’ protection against forms of public abuse: for instance, lack of law and 
order and insecure property rights negatively affect agents’ ability to 
appropriate the fruits of their efforts and to participate in a level playing 
field, while they facilitate the creation of rents and expose the same agents 
to government expropriations for the benefits of minorities. 
The reasons we expect institution extractiveness to be relevant in the size 
of informal economy can be summarized as follows. As shown by Piketty 
(1995), Aghion et al. (2011), Berggren et al. (2015), and Grosjean et al. (2013), 
the perceived (input and output) “legitimacy” of the institutions alters 
citizens’ attitudes towards public authorities and civil servants. Hence, to 
the extent that extractiveness affects their perceived “legitimacy”, it likely 
modifies the extent of informal activities agents decide to undertake 2 .  
Moreover, given the established impact that the quality of property rights 
(as defined by Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) yields on economic outcomes, 
extractive institutions likely alter the individual incentives to “exit” through 
the weakening of property rights. Accordingly, this work is not focused 
much on the impact of general and open-ended constitutional features of 
the institutional framework (e.g., the presence and quality of a formal 
                                                 
2 Our use of the term “legitimacy” is rather comprehensive and refers not only to a value-
based evaluation of the appropriateness of public structures and procedures (input-
legitimacy), but also to a more consequentialist assessment of government 
trustworthiness (Berggren et al., 2015). 
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democratic set-up), but rather on the effect of a specific trait of the 
institutional environment, namely their extractiveness. 
The paper contributes to the literature along several dimensions. 
Whereas the importance of extractiveness in affecting economic 
development is an established finding in the strand of the literature 
focusing on economic development, the same has not been acknowledged 
in the economic literature on the determinants of the size of informal 
activities. In the sociological literature on informality, only few works 
address different versions of the hypothesis that institutional features affect 
the size of the informal economy (see, among others, Feige, 1997; Centeno 
and Portes, 2006; Kus, 2010; Williams et al., 2015), and none has explicitly 
focused on extractiveness. 
Moreover, most sociological contributions indirectly referring to issues 
associated with extractiveness have produced either unconditional 
bivariate cross-country correlations or multiple regressions lacking 
adequate controls. Many studies have adopted vague and far-reaching 
indicators to capture institutional features: given that such indicators cover 
overlapping institutional concepts, such works do not allow to draw clear 
cut conclusions on the impact of extractiveness. In addition, a number of 
sociological studies have focused on the relations between informal 
economy and institutions at the micro-level through single case studies: 
these are not directly comparable and that prevents from drawing general 
insights. In any event, no contribution has explicitly discussed the role of 
the extractiveness of institutions. 
To the best of our knowledge, only few works have addressed similar 
research questions while adopting multivariate empirical analyses 3 . 
Teobaldelli and Schneider (2013) investigate whether the presence and the 
integrity of direct democratic institutions (such as popular initiatives and 
referendum) increase the opportunities for the citizens to exercise their 
“voice option” and reduce the extent to which they resort to “exit”. Their 
                                                 
3 Although not directly tackling the extractiveness of institutions, Adriaenssens and 
Hendrickx (2015) combine individual responses to a European Social Survey with 
country-level data and estimate the impact of direct regulation, tax burden, State 
strength, social relations, generalized trust and institutional trust on the individual 
decision to undertake informal activities. In their work, State strength is envisaged as 
the effective enforcement and access to public order contract enforcement and this is 
closed to what we shall define as the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector. 
This is different from the degree of extractiveness of institutions. It should also be noted 
in passing that, Adriaenssens and Hendrickx (2015) use to proxy for State strength the 
rule-of-law indicator; as we shall explain, this latter reflects by construction the degree 
to which people abide by the law and cannot be considered as distinct from informality. 
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work differs from ours in that it focuses on the role of direct democracy 
rather than that of the extractiveness of institutions and it covers a limited 
sample of (at most) 57 countries while we cover a larger sample of countries 
(118). Torgler and Schneider (2009) investigate the impact of various broad 
governance indicators on informality, but they focus primarily on the 
impact of tax morale and their analysis covers at most 50 countries. Kus 
(2010) covers up to 78 countries, but the specification includes a limited 
number of explanatory variables (among which very broad and far reaching 
indicators). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the idea of 
extractive institutions and discusses the main theoretical and 
methodological issues. The data are presented in Section 3 and the empirical 
specification in Section 4. The results are illustrated and discussed in Section 
5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Methodological caveats 
The first preliminary methodological issue that is worth discussing is 
what impact of institutions on the informal economy we intend to assess. In 
fact, institutions can affect the size of the informal economy directly, for 
they concur to shape the agents' incentives, but they can also affect it 
indirectly through their influence on the development process. There exists 
convincing evidence in the sociological and economic literature that 
institutions have a remarkable and long-lasting impact on many socio-
economic variables. Hence, to grasp the total (direct plus indirect) impact 
of institutions on the size of the informal economy, one should not control 
for those socio-economic variables that might impact on informal activities, 
but are in turn influenced by the quality of institutions. To grasp the direct 
impact of institutions on the informal economy, instead, all the other socio-
economic determinants are to be controlled for in the estimations. The direct 
impact that institutions have on informality has mainly to do with the short 
and medium run, whereas the total impact depends on the very long 
process through which institutions affect the economic and social 
conditions and these latter, eventually, influence the extent of informal 
activities. As anticipated, we shall focus on the direct impact of institutions 
on the size of the informal economy. 
The second issue to address regards the criteria to choose the explanatory 
variables among the very many candidates introduced in the literature 
among the possible determinants of informal economy and economic 
growth. First, we shall look at variables which allow to proxy for the distinct 
features of institutions we are mainly interested in: the extractiveness of 
institutions, as well as their efficiency and effectiveness. As we aim to cover 
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a sample of countries larger than those investigated in the previous 
literature on informality, we shall concentrate on those indicators that are 
available for more than 90 countries. However, both for the sake of 
completeness and to show the robustness of our main findings, we shall 
also perform a battery of estimations using additional indicators available 
for smaller samples. This second step will also allow to distinguish some 
important potential determinants of informality, such as trust and culture 
(as recommended, for instance, by Alesina and Giuliano, 2015), for which 
we do not have data for all the countries in the larger sample. 
 
Figure 1. Size of informal economy (% of official GDP) vs. WGI (2005) 
 
The first measures for the quality of institutions a researcher can think of 
are those in the World Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by Daniel 
Kaufmann and Art Kraay for the World Bank4. Indeed, the correlations 
between the size of informal economy, on the one hand, and the indicators 
for Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule-of-Law, on the 
other hand, are very high (Figure 1). As shown by Torgler and Schneider 
(2009), such negative correlations are confirmed even when a number of 
plausible controls (such as GDP per capita, the share of the agricultural 
sector, unemployment rate, fiscal burden, government interventionism) are 
accounted for. 
The problem with using these indicators is that, although to different 
extent, the WGI tend to summarize and “average” different concepts and 
aspects that a researcher interested in the precise features of institutions 
would like to disentangle. For instance, many WGI include (the perception 
about) the ability of a government to achieve results, the quality of the 
governmental objectives, the independence of the civil services from 
                                                 
4 The WGI draw on surveys of households and firms, commercial business information 
providers, non-governmental organizations, and public sector organizations. 
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politicians, the obedience of the general public and of the civil servants to 
the rules, and the like: one can hardly distinguish bad (i.e., extractive) 
policies from good policies that are badly (i.e., inefficiently) implemented5. 
Another issue with the WGI is that they often include sub-indicators that 
indirectly measure the informal economy: by construction, this artificially 
raises the correlation between the former and the latter. The WGI of the 
Rule-of-Law, for instance, covers the perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, that is in turn 
associated with the perceived dimension of the informal economy6. 
To be clear, these observations do not amount to criticism of the WGI per 
se: as they are exactly meant to be synthetic measures of a country’s 
institutional set-up, criticizing them for being far-reaching would be dull. 
Our claim, instead, is that these indicators do not help much to disentangle 
the impact of the two different aspects of institutions we are interested in: 
the extractiveness of institutions vs. their effectiveness/efficiency. 
Accordingly, in what follows we shall focus on a number of measures 
that might be plausibly associated with either the degree of extractiveness 
of the institutions in place or with their effectiveness and efficiency. 
Following the literature on the determinants of economic growth, to proxy 
for institution extractiveness we include variables measuring the protection 
of property rights, the degree of judicial independence, the impartiality of 
courts, the extent of military interference in politics, and the constraints on 
the executive. These variables measure alternative channels through which 
private resources may be extracted and diverted by the ruling elites. 
Democratic institutions appear as those political contexts in which the 
accountability of the ruling parties and personal freedom are higher; 
therefore, we proxy extractiveness also by means of measures of the 
strength of political rights and a dummy variable looking at the 
absence/presence of (de facto) democratic institutions7. 
                                                 
5 This is one of the reasons why these indicators are very highly correlated, as noted by 
Easterly and Levine (2003). 
6 Similar remarks hold true also for other broad indicators, such as the well known “Rule 
and Order“ indicator by the PRS group. As the ``Law'' component refers to the strength 
and impartiality of the legal system and the ``Order'' one assesses popular observance 
of the law, the combined index does not only measure the quality of institutions, but 
also people´s attitudes towards the rules, which are a manifestation rather than a 
determinant of the extent of informal activities. 
7 Differently from Teobaldelli and Schneider (2013), we do not measure the quality of 
democracy with polychotomous classifications (such as the Polity IV index) covering 
both subjective and objective considerations. We focus instead on a dichotomous 
variable based on observable features regarding the mechanism for selecting and 
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As to what concerns the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions, we 
introduce a number of variables that are associated with the complexity of 
the procedures to carry out in order to abide by the rules. A very long and 
complex procedure to solve a commercial controversy between private 
agents does not represent a tool to extract and reallocate resources, whereas 
it may signal inefficiencies in the functioning of institutions. Notably, these 
measures should not be confused with those capturing the burden of 
regulation (which is in turn a traditional determinant of the size of the 
informal economy we control for): even in very efficient administrations, 
regulations may be demanding because they regard very complicated 
aspects; on the contrary, even light regulations may lead to long lasting and 
time consuming procedures when institutions are inefficient. 
While, from a theoretical perspective, State regulation can be justified as 
the attempt of the authorities to tackle market failures, regulations can also 
be used to divert resources towards restricted groups of citizens (see, for 
instance, Stigler, 1971)8. In this case, it could be argued that there is a direct 
relationship between the extractiveness of institutions and the efficiency of 
regulations and civil services. Accordingly, distinguishing these two 
aspects would not be entirely warranted. Although we acknowledge that 
there could be situations where inefficiency is associated with 
extractiveness, we maintain that it would be wrong to use the former as a 
proxy of the latter. On the one hand, even convoluted and time-consuming 
regulatory procedures might be well-intended and genuinely directed 
towards redressing market failures, and yet individuals may choose to 
circumvent them simply for the sake of saving time and costs. On the other 
hand, in countries where institutions are highly extractive, the levels of 
regulation might be in fact low for this facilitates discrimination and 
arbitrary decisions by the public officials. Bortolotti et al. (2013) introduce 
the case of States acting as reluctant regulators, because the weaker the 
political institutions, the more the politicians influence regulatory agencies 
so as to extract benefits for State-owned firms: this implies that the existence 
of a legally independent regulator (typically conceived as a good 
institutional feature) does not guarantee per se that the decisions are really 
                                                 
removing the executive. As pointed out by Cheibub et al. (2010), it is important to 
choose measures of democracy that are in line with the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of a testable hypothesis. 
8 In principle, the identification of the demand of regulation by the citizens would allow 
to assess whether regulation is motivated by genuine concerns or not (see Aghion et al., 
2010; Pinotti, 2012). In practice this is not a viable solution for a large cross-country 
analysis as the one we carry out here. 
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independent. These examples effectively show why one needs to 
distinguish these factors in the empirical analysis. 
A final caveat is in order. There is not a uniquely established definition 
of “informal economy“ in the sociological and economic literature (see, for 
instance, Feige, 1990; Schneider and Enste, 2000, 2013; ILO, 2002; Hart, 2010; 
Andrews et al., 2011). Moreover, the estimates of the informal economy can 
be either based on indirect approaches (e.g., the currency demand 
approach, the electricity consumption method and the MIMIC model), 
grounded in discrepancies in national accounts, proxied by observed 
macroeconomic variables (such as self-employed, workers without 
contracts, employees without social security contributions, multiple-job 
holders, illegal immigrants and the like) or derived from micro-level 
surveys. To analyze the determinants of the size of the informal economy 
in the largest possible set of countries, this study borrows the recent 
estimates for the size of the shadow economy as percentage of the official 
GDP produced by Schneider et al. (2010) and computed by means of a 
MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) model, a model that links a 
number of allegedly causal variables (tax burden, regulation density, tax 
morale, income) to a number of possible “indicators“ of the size of the 
informal economy (increased monetary transactions, lower working hours 
and labor participation in the official economy, lower labor inputs in the 
official economy, decreased growth rates of official GDP). A factor-analysis 
is carried out to measure the informal economy as an unobserved variable 
over time. In particular, the MIMIC model consists of two parts: the first 
(the measurement model) links the unobserved variable (the informal 
economy) to the observed indicators; the second (the structural equations 
model) specifies the causal relationships for the unobserved variable. In so 
doing, it allows to consider both the multiple causes of the informal 
economy and its multiple effects over time (see Schneider and Enste, 2013, 
Chapter 3).
Copyright © 2018 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved.  
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Table 1. Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Description Source Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Informal economy Shadow economy (% of official GDP) Schneider et al. (2010) 118 33.0 13.2 8.5 65.1 
GDP per capita ln expenditure-side real GDP PPPs per capita PWT 8.1 118 8.53 1.33 5.88 11.42 
Agriculture VA ln % agriculture value added on total value added WDI 118 2.14 1.27 -2.85 4.20 
Population above 65 ln % population aged 65 and above on total population WDI 118 1.82 0.69 0.30 2.99 
Pop largest city ln % population in the largest city on total urban population WDI 118 3.32 0.59 1.11 4.61 
Fractionalization Degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1985 Roeder (2001) 118 0.47 0.28 0 0.92 
Protestants % protestants on total population in 1980 La Porta et al. (1999) 118 11.6 20.6 0 97.8 
Executive constraints Constraints on executives (1 low – 7 high) Polity IV 117 5.05 1.92 1 7.00 
Military interference Military interference in rule of law and politics (0 low – 10 high) Fraser Institute 108 6.34 2.85 0 10 
Reliability of police Reliability of police (0 low – 10 high) Fraser Institute 95 5.22 1.97 1.82 9.38 
Democratic regime Dummy for regimes with free elections and alternating parties Cheibub et al. (2010) 118 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Age democracy Years since the democratic transition Cheibub et al. (2010) 118 22.4 34.3 0 136 
Political rights political rights index (1 weak – 7 strong) Freedom House 118 3.37 2.05 1 7 
Legal rights Strength of legal rights index (0 weak – 10 strong) WDI 116 5.04 2.44 0 10 
Impartiality of courts Impartiality of courts (0 low – 10 high) Fraser institute 108 4.69 1.95 0.93 9.2 
Judicial independence Judicial independence (0 low – 10 high) Fraser institute 94 4.71 2.33 0.31 9.18 
Property rights protection Protection of property rights (0 low – 10 high) Fraser institute 94 5.98 1.92 1.44 9.61 
Rents from natural resources Rents from gas, oil and minerals (% of GDP) WDI 118 9.89 17.9 0 79.75 
Labor market regulations Overall labor market regulations (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 108 6.03 1.42 3 9.1 
Hiring and firing regulations Hiring and firing regulations (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 94 4.84 1.57 1.69 8.16 
Cost worker dismissal Mandated cost of worker dismissal (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 106 5.71 3.21 0 10 
Hours regulations Hours Regulations (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 108 7.18 1.90 3.3 10 
Hiring regulations and min wage Hiring regulations and minimum wage (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 108 6.41 2.88 0 10 
Bureaucracy costs Bureaucracy costs (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 94 4.61 1.74 0.46 9.94 
Administrative burden Administrative requirements (0 high – 10 low) Fraser institute 94 3.43 1.12 1.39 6.79 
Time to pay taxes ln days to prepare and pay taxes WDI 116 5.72 0.69 3.89 7.86 
Time to resolve insolvency ln years to resolve insolvency WDI 112 0.96 0.55 -0.92 2.30 
Time to enforce a contract ln days to enforce a contract WDI 116 6.29 0.46 4.79 7.45 
ICQ: tolerance and respect Important child qualities: tolerance and respect WVS (A032) 47 0.71 0.13 0.36 0.94 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable Description Source Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
ICQ: unselfishness Important child qualities: unselfishness WVS (A041) 47 0.35 0.13 0.07 0.61 
ICQ: obedience Important child qualities: obedience WVS (A042) 47 0.41 0.18 0.05 0.82 
ICQ: feeling of responsibility Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility WVS (A032) 47 0.73 0.14 0.39 0.92 
ICQ: hard work Important child qualities: hard work WVS (A030) 47 0.53 0.24 0.10 0.89 
Justifiable to avoid fare on public 
transport 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport (1-10) WVS (F115) 46 2.62 0.73 1.58 4.31 
Justifiable to cheat on taxes Justifiable: cheating on taxes (1-10) WVS (F116) 47 2.26 0.64 1 3.66 
Justifiable to buy stolen goods Justifiable: buying stolen goods (1-10) in 1995 WVS (F139) 44 1.82 0.42 1.11 3.19 
Trust in family Complete trust in family WVS (D001) 44 0.84 0.08 0.63 0.97 
Generalized trust Most people can be trusted WVS (A165) 46 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.74 
No member of local community See myself not as a member of local community WVS (G020) 41 1.69 0.20 1.26 2.19 
No citizen of the country See myself not as a citizen of the country WVS (G021) 41 1.49 0.18 1.14 1.84 
Willingness to fight for country Willingness to fight for the country WVS (E012) 46 0.71 0.17 0.25 0.97 
Distrust in labor unions Distrust: labor unions WVS (E069-05) 47 2.70 0.31 1.58 3.41 
Distrust in police Distrust: the police WVS (E069-06) 46 2.34 0.38 1.46 3.11 
Distrust in Parliament Distrust: Parliament WVS (E069-07) 46 2.68 0.43 1.23 3.38 
Distrust in civil services Distrust: the civil services WVS (E069-08) 47 2.59 0.33 1.63 3.38 
Distrust in Government Distrust: the Government WVS (E069-11) 45 2.55 0.41 1.22 3.26 
Distrust in political parties Distrust: the political parties WVS (E069-12) 46 2.92 0.36 1.44 3.42 
Distrust in courts Distrust: justice system/courts WVS (E069-17) 45 2.41 0.39 1.48 3.13 
Dissatisfaction with democracy Dissatisfaction with the way democracy develops (2000) WVS (E110) 37 2.58 0.43 1.41 3.24 
All data refer to 2005 where not else specified. PWT = Penn World Tables, WDI = World Bank Development Indicators WVS = World Value Survey (country 
averages). 
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3 Data 
The largest sample is made up of 118 countries in 20059. As discussed in 
the previous section, the dependent variable in our regressions is the size of 
the informal economy as a percentage of the official GDP computed by 
means of a MIMIC model, taken from Schneider et al. (2010). 
Table 1 reports the descriptions, the sources and the summary statistics 
of all the variables used in the regressions. 
Among the controls we include in every regression, there is the 
expenditure-side real GDP per capita in PPP (taken from the Penn World 
Table 8.1, 2005). This variable is meant to control for all the factors affecting 
the size of informal economy associated with the stage of economic 
development, as well as with the indirect effects of institutions (see Section 
2). 
We also control for the differences in the sectoral structure of the 
economy, by including among the regressors the share of agriculture value 
added, and also the demographic structure and the degree of urban 
concentration, by employing, respectively, the percentage of population 
aged 65 and above and the share of population in the largest city on total 
urban population. All these variables come from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) for the year 2005. 
Following the results in Lassen (2007) and Teobaldelli and Schneider 
(2013), we include an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization present in 
1985, and we also control for whether the most diffused religion is 
                                                 
9 The sample is made up of OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) and non-
OECD countries (Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Rep. Congo, Costa 
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, 
Indonesian, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe). 
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Protestantism in order to pick some cultural and institutions-unrelated 
variables as done, for instance, in Teobaldelli and Schneider (2013)10. 
Extractive institutions alter the allocation of public and private resources 
towards uses that do not maximize the population well-being, but that 
ensure that certain groups of individuals exploit the rest of the population. 
On the one hand, the general and open-ended constitutional features of the 
institutional framework should not capture the extractiveness of 
institutions; on the other hand, the actual functioning of the political and 
legal frameworks may reflect the ultimate goals of the ruling class and 
proxy their extractiveness. We test this hypothesis by employing a number 
of variables about the actual functioning of the institutional framework to 
see to what extent they exercise an influence on the size of the informal 
economy. In particular, we look at the presence of external constraints on 
the executive (Polity IV), the interventionism of the military in the political 
life (Fraser Institute), the reliability of the police (Fraser Institute), the 
presence or absence of democracy11, the age of the democratic regime (if 
present in 2005), the strength of political rights (Fraser Institute) and of legal 
rights (WDI), the impartiality of courts (Fraser Institute), judicial 
independence (Fraser Institute), and the protection of property rights 
(Fraser Institute). 
To grasp how certain economic activities carried out under the direct 
control of the government may alter the incentives in the private sector, we 
employ among the proxies of extractiveness the share of GDP accruing to 
rents from the exploitation of natural resources (oil, gas and minerals) 
(WDI)12. 
According to previous theoretical studies on the determinants of the 
informal economy, the level of taxation and the burden of regulation are 
likely to play a leading role. According to the neoliberal approach following 
De Soto (1989), even in very efficient and probe administrations, regulations 
may be too burdensome and induce people to circumvent them by 
                                                 
10 Although not reported here, we estimated specifications including three dummies; 
besides the one taking value 1 if the majority of the population is Protestant, one taking 
one if Catholics are the majority, one for Muslim (La Porta et al., 1999). None of these 
variables turn out to be significant in any of the specifications and sub-samples. 
11 We consider a dummy variable taking value 0 if one of the following conditions is 
present in 2005: little competition among multiple political parties, lack of alternating 
parties, non-elective procedures for the selection of the executive, absence of elective 
legislature. This variable is borrowed from Cheibub et al. (2010). 
12 Besides adopting variables identified in previous works on extractive institutions, we 
try and include measures of both de jure and de facto institutions, so as to reflect both 
constitutional constraints and actual institutional outcomes (see Glaeser et al., 2004). 
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“exiting“. This view is contended by a number of scholars (see, for instance, 
Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Williams, 2015), who maintain that such 
alleged relationship is not validated by empirical evidence. Hence, the 
hypothesis to test is that regulations might alter the incentives to switch into 
informality. In this respect, a set of variables we employ refer to labor 
markets: first, we use an overall indicator of labor market regulations 
elaborated by the Fraser Institute and then a series of sub-indicators (hiring 
regulations and minimum wage, hiring and firing regulations, hours 
regulations, mandated costs of worker dismissal) which participate in the 
construction of the overall indicator. Then, we employ a measure of the 
stringency of standards on product/service quality, energy and other 
regulations (outside environmental regulations) issued by the government; 
to this end, we employ the indicator elaborated by the Fraser Institute on 
the basis of the Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic 
Forum. 
Procedures may be burdensome either because they are stringent, or 
because the issue at stake is complex or, finally, because the regulatory 
framework is inefficient. In fact, even light regulations may lead to long 
lasting and time consuming procedures when institutions are inefficient. To 
pick up this effect we shall focus on specific measures that more directly 
proxy the efficiency of the institutions rather than the complexity of the 
issues to regulate: the number of days to prepare and pay taxes (in logs, 
from the WDI), the number of years to resolve insolvency (in logs, from the 
WDI), the number of days required to enforce a contract (in logs, from the 
WDI). We also look at the extent to which firms find that complying with 
the administrative requirements (permits, regulations, reporting) issued by 
the government is burdensome: we employ an index elaborate by the Fraser 
Institute on the basis of the Global Competitiveness Report by the World 
Economic Forum. 
In order to test the role played by ` `cultural'' factors and trust, we employ 
some variables built by elaborating the data in the 2005 wave of the World 
Values Survey. Limited data availability will force us to analyze a smaller 
set of countries (48). We shall run a battery of regressions to account for 
culture and trust, as well as for additional proxies of the quality of 
institutions that are available only for such a limited sample. 
It is worth stressing again that, for the reasons explained in Section 2, we 
do not employ the aggregated indexes on the rule of law, government 
efficiency, and quality of regulation provided by the World Bank World 
Governance Indicators. Although highly significant variables in previous 
studies, these measures do not allow to disentangle the different 
phenomena we are interested in and often contain sub-indicators that 
overlap with specific forms of informal activities. 
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4 The empirical specification 
To address our research question, we estimate a specification including 
several plausible determinants of the size of the informal economy in view 
to exploiting the cross-country variation in the data for about 100 countries 
in the year 2005. This year allows to use recent estimates of informal 
economies while avoiding the variability brought about by the excesses due 
to market bonanza in 2006-2007 and the following global financial crisis. 
Moreover, analyzing previous years would have prevented from capturing 
the noticeable rise of a number of developing countries and would have 
reduced the size of the sample due to greater lack of reliable data for the 
explanatory variables and the controls in the early 2000s. 
As maintained in the previous sections, we include the explanatory 
factors proxing for the extractiveness of institutions, for the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the institutions, as well as the burden complexity of 
regulations. We also add to the specification those socio-economic controls 
that either were found significant in previous studies or may be intuitively 
associated with the indirect effects of institutions on informality (see Section 
2). All the variables are computed for 2005 (or the closest year if 2005 is not 
available). 
The most concise and general form we estimate looks like the following: 
  𝑰𝑬𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊 + 𝜷𝑸𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊      (1) 
 
where IEi is the size of informal in country i, 𝑋𝑖  is a vector containing 
several socio-economic controls, 𝑄𝑖 is a vector of proxies for the quality of 
institutions we are interested in, 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. As anticipated, 𝑄𝑖 
includes, in turn, proxies of the extractiveness of institutions in country i, 
proxies for their effectiveness and efficiency, and measures of the burden 
associated with the complexity of regulations. 
5 Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimated coefficients in the different 
specifications. All the specifications share the same dependent variable and 
the same controls (in the upper part of the tables), i.e. the variables that the 
economic intuition and the literature suggest to be associated with the size 
of the informal economy, and each one differs from the others only in terms 
of the variable adopted to proxy for the extractiveness of institutions. 
Table 2 includes the variables associated with the actual functioning of 
the democratic context (if present), the strength of political and legal rights, 
the interference of the military into the political life, the reliability of police, 
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and the strength of the external constraints on the executive. Each of these 
variables, as argued, captures a feature of the institutional framework that 
may favor extractive policies and decisions from those who yield power. 
All the parameters have the expected sign, but only the reliability of 
police and the age of the democratic regime have a statistically significant 
relationship with the size of the informal economy: the more the police is 
reliable and the more consolidated is the democratic regime, the lower the 
extent of informality. 
 
Table 2. Informality and Institution Extractiveness (I)      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP per capita -3.060 -3.305 -2.691 -3.011 -2.451 -3.107 -3.796* 
 (1.927) (2.157) (2.325) (1.935) (1.885) (1.924) (1.974) 
Agriculture VA 3.569** 3.657** 3.202 3.473** 3.219* 3.313* 3.518** 
 (1.671) (1.763) (1.935) (1.681) (1.627) (1.673) (1.705) 
Population above 65 5.642** 4.898* 3.986 3.832* 5.160** 5.075** 5.981** 
 (2.433) (2.631) (3.001) (2.261) (2.108) (2.315) (2.416) 
Population in largest city 5.102*** 5.024*** 4.835*** 4.989*** 4.171** 4.983*** 5.005*** 
 (1.614) (1.690) (1.726) (1.620) (1.597) (1.609) (1.628) 
Fractionalization 9.864** 8.394* 5.665 8.847** 9.336** 9.475** 9.487** 
 (4.042) (4.275) (4.630) (3.981) (3.858) (3.987) (4.044) 
Protestants -0.049 -0.042 -0.0223 -0.058 -0.005 -0.046 -0.034 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) 
Executive constraints -0.789       
 (0.592)       
Military interference  -0.312      
  (0.489)      
Reliability of police   -1.923***     
   (0.727)     
Democratic regime    0.267    
    (2.091)    
Age democracy     -0.0985***   
     (0.0364)   
Political rights      0.668  
      (0.553)  
Legal rights       -0.495 
       (0.431) 
Observations 117 108 95 118 118 118 116 
Adjusted-R2 .469 .460 .494 .459 .493 .466 .467 
Dep. variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. Significance 
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Table 3 shows that the higher the impartiality of courts, the judicial 
independence, and the protection of property rights, the lower the share of 
informal activities in the economy. The quality of property rights 
institutions, thus, appears a key determinant of the extent of the informal 
economy, as well as previous studies have shown it affects long-term 
growth (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Countries whose economy is 
concentrated on the exploitation of natural resources are characterized by a 
large share of informal economy: this is in line with the concept of “resource 
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curse“, whereby the excessive reliance by an elite on the revenues from 
natural resources exploitation is conducive to problems of economic 
dualism and extractive institutions. 
 
Table 3. Informality and Institution Extractiveness (II) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita -1.839 -2.248 -2.045 -4.806** 
 (2.292) (1.957) (2.284) (1.972) 
Agriculture VA 3.240* 1.762 2.457 3.108* 
 (1.856) (1.687) (1.915) (1.625) 
Population above 65 2.813 3.187 3.369 7.281*** 
 (2.948) (2.449) (2.936) (2.366) 
Population in largest city 4.408** 4.703*** 4.765*** 5.066*** 
 (1.683) (1.560) (1.683) (1.564) 
Fractionalization 6.839 8.222** 6.713 8.526** 
 (4.491) (3.931) (4.492) (3.843) 
Protestants 0.023 0.051 0.011 -0.049 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.044) 
Judicial independence -2.158***    
 (0.606)    
Impartiality of courts  -2.994***   
  (0.703)   
Property rights protection   -2.885**  
   (0.811)  
Rents from natural resources    0.163*** 
    (0.0573) 
Observations 94 108 94 118 
Adjusted-R2 .521 .541 .521 .496 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
The results in these tables suggest that the size of the informal economy 
is notably affected by: i) the reliability of those entrusted with the use of the 
force; ii) the duration of a (de facto) democratic regime; iii) an extraordinary 
reliance of the economy on the extraction of natural resources; iv) the 
quality of “property rights institutions”, measured in terms of judicial 
independence and impartiality, and protection of property rights. This 
evidence provides support to the hypothesis that institution extractiveness 
is associated with the size of the informal economy. Besides the individual 
significance of the parameters, the fit of the estimation improves 
remarkably when these proxies of the extractiveness of institutions are 
included in the specification. 
It is worth mentioning that the control variables, when significant, have 
the correct sign: in particular, the proxy of urbanization, the economic 
structure and the fractionalization of the population. The estimates of the 
parameters of the variables proxying for the burden of regulation are 
reported in Table 4. 
 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 9, Issue 1, Spring-Summer 2018, Article 2 
 
Copyright © 2018 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved. 
18 
Table 4. Informality, Market Regulations and Effectiveness/Efficiency of Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita -3.617* -3.190 -3.488* -2.921 -3.209 -3.644* -3.550* -3.699* 
 (2.073) (2.375) (2.037) (2.435) (2.411) (1.905) (1.991) (1.973) 
Agriculture VA 3.361* 4.275** 3.589** 4.492** 4.185** 2.372 4.284** 3.651** 
 (1.760) (1.896) (1.714) (1.948) (1.977) (1.698) (1.746) (1.696) 
Population above 65 4.638* 4.271 4.209 4.226 3.715 4.168* 5.345** 5.753** 
 (2.602) (3.188) (2.564) (3.163) (3.126) (2.311) (2.407) (2.386) 
Population in largest 
city 
5.148*** 4.555*** 4.621*** 4.530** 4.948*** 6.537*** 5.129*** 5.456*** 
 (1.674) (1.788) (1.653) (1.798) (1.824) (1.642) (1.660) (1.663) 
Fractionalization 8.861** 6.806 9.021** 7.103 7.049 8.211** 8.347** 8.477** 
 (4.226) (4.849) (4.150) (4.797) (4.780) (3.852) (4.058) (3.992) 
Protestants -0.046 -0.043 -0.057 -0.040 -0.040 -0.025 -0.055 -0.041 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) 
Labor market 
regulations 
-1.038        
 (0.685)        
Hiring and firing 
regulations 
 0.631       
  (0.762)       
Cost worker dismissal  -0.209       
  (0.381)       
Hours regulations  -0.897 -1.223**      
  (0.588) (0.495)      
Hiring reg. and min 
wage 
 -0.287       
  (0.407)       
Bureaucracy costs    -0.593     
    (0.836)     
Administrative burden     -1.095    
     (1.040)    
Time to pay taxes      4.493***  
      (1.489)   
Time to resolve 
insolvency 
      -0.745  
       (1.933)  
Time to enforce a 
contract 
       2.291 
        (2.172) 
Observations 108 92 108 94 94 116 112 116 
Adjusted-R2 .470 .475 .489 .454 .457 .503 .471 .466 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
With the exception of the stringency of the regulations on working hours, 
which is significantly and positively associated with the size of the informal 
economy, other labor market regulations and the stringency of other 
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standards do not seem significantly associated with the size of the informal 
activities13.  
Most of the measures of the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions 
are also not statistically significant, with the exception of the time needed 
to pay taxes: the more time-consuming the procedures to comply with the 
tax requirements, the higher the share of the informal economy. An 
explanation for these findings can be the following. The fact that the time to 
enforce a contract or to resolve an insolvency is long does not provide an 
incentive to keep economic activities informal, because informality 
provides no benefits in terms of contract enforcement. On the contrary, as 
informality is often conducive to tax evasion, it does eliminate the problems 
associated with the compliance with heavy tax procedures. 
 5.1 The role of cultural values and trust 
Previous works have shown that culture and trust may affect the size of 
the informal economy. In what follows we test this hypothesis. 
Culture, trust and moral attitudes play a role in the decisions individuals 
make regarding whether or not to cheat on the State because, as suggested 
by Hart (1973), individuals make decisions also on the basis of the 
prevailing norms. Trust has proved to affect both economic development 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Woolcock, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Trigilia, 2001) and 
individual behavior (Buttler et al., 2016). To a certain extent, formal 
institutions might influence these factors (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015) and 
this implies that controlling for them in the empirical analysis absorbs one 
channel through which institutions indirectly affect the size of the informal 
economy. It is worth recalling, however, that we are interested in estimating 
the direct impact of institutions on the size of the informal economy and 
that their indirect impact falls beyond the scope of the analysis. Hence, in 
line with our first methodological caveat in Section 2, the inclusion of 
proxies for culture, trust and generalized morality is warranted even 
though institutions influence them and thus indirectly impact on the size of 
the informal economy. 
To deal with these variables, we adopt the answers provided to a number 
of questions in the World Values Survey (WVS), which is the most 
commonly used tool in cross-country comparisons. As done in the literature 
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015), we aggregate the answers at the country level 
                                                 
13 These variables take a maximum value of 10 when the restrictions are low. Accordingly, 
a negative parameter implies that the higher the regulation, the larger the informal 
economy. 
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to measure values and beliefs that characterize the prevailing culture, trust 
and attitudes. Data availability reduces the sample size14. 
To capture deep attitudes not directly connected with economic activity 
(so as to reduce the risk of reverse causality), we consider the nationwide 
average responses to the WVS questions regarding the importance of 
qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home: tolerance, 
unselfishness, obedience, responsibility, and hard work. Following the 
reasoning proposed by Tabellini (2008; 2010), these measures can be used 
to capture various aspects of generalized morality.  
Table 5: Informality, Generalized Morality and Civic Sense 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita -5.405 -5.396 -5.108 -6.071 -5.756 -7.063** -4.205 -11.47 
 (3.616) (3.371) (3.342) (3.685) (3.428) (2.975) (3.254) (6.968) 
Agriculture VA 4.525 3.756 4.724 4.292 5.093 3.991 5.354* 1.559 
 (3.144) (3.099) (3.010) (3.112) (3.134) (2.648) (2.920) (5.213) 
Population above 65 10.42** 9.394** 13.37*** 10.33** 10.99** 11.47*** 8.893** 9.738* 
 (4.236) (4.214) (4.530) (4.199) (4.220) (3.632) (3.994) (5.472) 
Population in largest city 5.278** 6.253** 5.208** 5.381** 4.820** 5.075** 5.567** 4.728 
 (2.491) (2.413) (2.264) (2.326) (2.370) (1.991) (2.184) (3.119) 
Fractionalization 7.459 7.197 7.409 8.640 8.021 0.311 2.942 -0.576 
 (6.855) (6.714) (6.643) (7.178) (6.796) (6.122) (6.686) (10.04) 
Protestants -0.049 -0.075 -0.045 -0.047 -0.061 -0.005 -0.046 -0.029 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) (0.061) (0.065) (0.089) 
ICQ: tolerance and respect 0.629        
 (18.88)        
ICQ: unselfishness  -15.09       
  (12.33)       
ICQ: obedience   16.54      
   (10.86)      
ICQ: feeling of responsibility    8.573     
    (16.61)     
ICQ: hard work     -6.857    
     (7.676)    
Justifiable to avoid fare on public 
transport 
     7.150***   
      (1.870)   
Justifiable to cheat on taxes       5.310**  
       (2.264)  
Justifiable to buy stolen goods        3.234 
        (7.846) 
Observations 47 47 47 47 47 46 47 28 
Adjusted-R2 .461 .481 .491 .464 .471 .612 .527 .476 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
                                                 
14 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimations presented in the previous 
section for the sub-sample of countries for which we have data on culture, trust and 
sense of belonging. The findings in the previous section hold also for the sub-sample of 
countries investigated in this section. Results are available upon request. 
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We also proxy civic sense by looking at the answers to questions about 
whether it is justifiable to avoid a fare on public transport, to cheat on taxes, 
and to buy stolen goods. 
The results in Table 5 show that none of the variables capturing the 
qualities children are expected to learn at home has a statistically significant 
partial correlation with informality. These findings suggest that cross-
country differences in what the majority perceives as the main qualities a 
person should exhibit are not relevant determinants of the size of the 
informal economy. On the contrary, two variables regarding what wrong 
behavior is considered anyway justifiable have a significant positive impact 
on the size of the informal economy. If avoiding to pay the fare on public 
transports or to cheat on taxes is seen as justifiable by the majority, then also 
undertaking informal (but not illegal) economic activities is considered as 
justifiable. Notably, this result does not hold for the variable that more 
directly relates to the sphere of the private economic life, that is buying 
stolen goods. This result, together with the insignificance of the variables 
on the qualities children should learn, suggests the existence of a 
relationship between informality and the way people think of what is due, 
at least in economic terms, to the public sector they observe and interact 
with. 
We show in Tables 6 and 7 that the inclusion of these significant variables 
in the baseline specification used for the large sample does not affect the 
estimated impact of the extractiveness of institutions on the informal 
economy15. Only the inclusion of the variable measuring to what extent is 
justifiable to avoid a fare on public transports reduces somewhat the 
statistical significance of the results (Table 6). 
Besides culture, also trust and sense of belonging are other important 
variables to account for. To address the role of trust, we look both at 
generalized trust (measured as the share of the WVS respondents agreeing 
with the sentence ``Most people can be trusted'') and family-related trust 
(measured as the share of respondents putting absolute faith in their 
family). In addition to such usual proxies of generalized trust and trust in 
the family, we also consider measures capturing the extent to which 
respondents share a sense of belonging to their community: these are 
derived from the WVS answers to questions about the extent to which they: 
i) see themselves not as members of their local community, ii) see 
themselves not as citizens of their nation, and iii) are willing to fight for the 
country (Table 8). 
 
                                                 
15 This holds true also for the other insignificant variables proxying for the generalized 
morality and civic sense. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 6: Informality, Civic Sense and Institution Extractiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita -3.242 -1.340 -2.482 -1.289 -2.853 
 (3.433) (3.516) (3.095) (3.497) (3.111) 
Agriculture VA 3.918 3.903 2.897 2.947 4.438 
 (3.097) (3.021) (2.868) (3.092) (2.773) 
Population above 65 7.588* 5.255 6.145 5.247 10.88*** 
 (4.084) (4.175) (3.855) (4.147) (3.845) 
Population in largest city 6.153*** 6.122*** 6.052*** 6.615*** 5.341** 
 (2.194) (2.148) (2.039) (2.158) (2.057) 
Fractionalization 2.411 3.398 6.550 4.955 8.748 
 (7.384) (7.270) (6.365) (7.341) (6.721) 
Protestants -0.017 0.005 0.068 -0.001 0.024 
 (0.0710) (0.0718) (0.0742) (0.0702) (0.0678) 
Justifiable to cheat on taxes 4.800* 5.696** 4.726** 5.793** 4.853** 
 (2.533) (2.386) (2.117) (2.371) (2.138) 
Reliability of police -2.007*     
 (1.022)     
Judicial independence  -2.139**    
  (0.914)    
Impartiality of courts   -3.018**   
   (1.134)   
Property rights protection    -3.168**  
    (1.309)  
Age of democracy     -0.119** 
     (0.0483) 
Observations 44 44 47 44 47 
Adjusted-R2 .557 .575 .591 .579 .581 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
In line with previous results in the literature, generalized trust is 
negatively associated with the extent of the informal economy16. Neither 
particularized trust in the family, nor the variables capturing the sense of 
belonging to the local and national communities are, instead, statistically 
significant. The result for particularized trust in the family is interesting as 
previous works have found a negative correlation between the reliance on 
family and civic sense, as well as a relationship between family ties and the 
industrial structure. Moreover, as shown in Table 9, the control for 
generalized trust in the baseline specification does not affect the estimated 
impact of the extractiveness of institutions on the informal economy. 
The last extension we consider regards another kind of trust, which is 
particularized trust in various specific institutions. As argued by Alesina 
and Giuliano (2015), while the responses to questions regarding trust 
toward public institutions may reflect cultural biases, they may also 
measure various dysfunctional aspects of formal institutions, among which 
                                                 
16 On the importance of generalized trust, also as a measure of social capital, see Aghion 
et al. (2010); Algan and Cahuc (2010, 2014); Alesina and Giuliano (2015). 
Coletto, Fracasso and Vittucci Marzetti: Informal economy and extractive institutions 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/240  
23 
certainly their extractiveness: when institutions arbitrarily jeopardize what 
people consider their legitimate share of resources and opportunities, they 
act in an extractive way and, inevitably, they are distrusted.  
Table 7: Informality, Civic Sense and Institution Extractiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita -5.840* -4.657 -5.497* -4.456 -5.817* 
 (3.411) (3.581) (2.996) (3.505) (2.946) 
Agriculture VA 3.484 3.471 2.402 2.688 3.385 
 (2.975) (2.936) (2.697) (2.980) (2.578) 
Population above 65 10.55** 9.139** 9.247** 8.940** 12.94*** 
 (3.982) (4.172) (3.707) (4.082) (3.592) 
Population in largest city 5.346** 5.265** 5.473*** 5.634** 4.940** 
 (2.102) (2.072) (1.939) (2.070) (1.925) 
Fractionalization 1.932 3.050 3.603 4.281 5.470 
 (6.875) (6.912) (6.176) (6.946) (6.493) 
Protestants 0.008 0.023 0.069 0.025 0.045 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.064) 
Justifiable to avoid fare on public transport 5.900** 6.114*** 6.054*** 6.190*** 6.073*** 
 (2.201) (2.050) (1.901) (1.979) (1.892) 
Reliability of police -1.257     
 (1.062)     
Judicial independence  -1.358    
  (0.941)    
Impartiality of courts   -2.129*   
   (1.128)   
Protection    -2.257*  
    (1.308)  
Age of democracy     -0.0918* 
     (0.0477) 
Observations 43 43 46 43 46 
Adjusted-R2 .598 .606 .636 .615 .638 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
We thus include variables capturing the share of the respondents that 
distrust labor unions, police, parliament, civil services, government, 
political parties, and justice system. We also consider a variable measuring 
the share of the population dissatisfied with the way democracy develops. 
The results, summarized in Table 10, are remarkably consistent and all 
measures are strongly correlated with the size of the informal economy. 
Again, we believe that this provides further evidence of the importance of 
the perceived functioning of institutions, besides their merely formal 
setting, for the extent of the informal economy. 
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Table 8: Informality, Trust and Sense of Belonging 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita -5.572 -5.895* -4.634 -4.592 -5.696 
 (3.519) (3.218) (3.588) (3.575) (3.539) 
Agriculture VA 3.947 4.663 4.620 4.552 4.364 
 (3.130) (2.975) (3.401) (3.473) (3.349) 
Population above 65 11.10** 13.20*** 10.33** 10.46** 10.97 ** 
 (4.127) (4.029) (4.376) (4.199) (4.805) 
Population in largest city 6.482*** 3.935* 6.089** 6.035** 5.311** 
 (2.378) (2.214) (2.459) (2.384) (2.394) 
Fractionalization 3.248 4.657 7.602 7.694 7.340 
 (6.843) (6.561) (6.841) (6.782) (7.088) 
Protestants -0.080 0.085 -0.034 -0.038 -0.044 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.0734) (0.081) (0.075) 
Trust in family -28.94     
 (18.76)     
Generalized trust  -32.96**    
  (12.25)    
No member of local community   0.598   
   (10.35)   
No citizen of the country    -0.928  
    (10.87)  
Willingness to fight for country     0.762 
     (12.34) 
Observations 44 46 41 41 46 
Adjusted-R2 .496 .548 .457 .457 .463 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 9: Informality, Generalized Trust and Institution Extractiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP per capita -4.008 -2.509 -4.223 -2.285 -4.734 
 (3.361) (3.624) (3.184) (3.512) (3.105) 
Agriculture VA 4.018 5.023 2.655 3.909 3.102 
 (3.202) (3.172) (3.006) (3.209) (2.914) 
Population above 65 10.29** 9.155** 10.12** 8.903** 14.45*** 
 (4.082) (4.393) (4.129) (4.242) (3.872) 
Population in largest city 4.354* 4.033* 4.678** 4.409* 4.049* 
 (2.231) (2.259) (2.151) (2.232) (2.107) 
Fractionalization 6.157 6.471 7.893 8.321 11.82 
 (6.940) (7.119) (6.472) (7.100) (7.015) 
Protestants 0.146 0.136 0.149* 0.154* 0.143* 
 (0.088) (0.090) (0.085) (0.089) (0.083) 
Generalized trust -32.33** -30.87** -25.40** -33.82** -28.75** 
 (12.94) (13.59) (12.28) (12.78) (11.81) 
Reliability of police -2.219**     
 (1.062)     
Judicial independence  -1.650*    
  (0.974)    
Impartiality of courts   -2.524**   
   (1.203)   
Property rights protection    -2.814**  
    (1.329)  
Age of democracy     -0.119** 
     (0.0532) 
Observations 43 43 46 43 46 
Adjusted-R2 .588 .572 .585 .590 .591 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 10: Informality and Distrust in Formal Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita -5.656* -4.624 -4.875 -5.358 -4.354 -5.048 -5.388 -4.616 
 (3.218) (3.019) (3.130) (3.228) (3.348) (3.101) (3.302) (5.325) 
Agriculture VA 4.610 3.783 5.619* 4.810 5.278* 6.209** 4.102 5.731 
 (2.898) (2.723) (2.843) (2.911) (2.999) (2.847) (2.972) (4.894) 
Population above 65 7.128* 5.740 6.745 7.917* 5.514 7.807* 7.665* 5.902 
 (4.181) (3.969) (4.075) (4.105) (4.727) (3.944) (4.487) (5.579) 
Population in largest city 3.549 4.789** 3.919* 3.716 4.771** 2.976 4.465* 5.621* 
 (2.306) (2.070) (2.190) (2.298) (2.295) (2.246) (2.283) (2.696) 
Fractionalization 3.702 0.938 3.883 4.528 4.545 4.078 2.972 -4.826 
 (6.599) (6.641) (6.729) (6.554) (7.701) (6.654) (7.266) (9.225) 
Protestants 0.001 0.012 0.007 -0.011 -0.028 0.000 -0.011 0.146 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.070) (0.150) 
Distrust in labor unions 12.41**        
 (5.287)        
Distrust in police  13.96***       
  (3.890)       
Distrust in Parliament   10.74***      
   (3.535)      
Distrust in civil services    10.54**     
    (4.634)     
Distrust in government     9.722**    
     (4.225)    
Distrust in political parties      13.40***   
      (4.230)   
Distrust in courts       7.481*  
       (4.272)  
Dissatisfaction with democracy        15.78** 
        (5.384) 
Observations 47 46 46 47 45 46 45 21 
Adjusted-R2 .527 .593 .562 .524 .514 .569 .495 .579 
Dependent variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
5.2 Results for non-OECD countries 
It could be argued that the degree of cross-country heterogeneity in the 
impact of institutions on the size of informal economic activities warrants 
the distinction between developed and developing countries. 
Notwithstanding the controls inserted in the baseline regressions to account 
for this, there might be country-specific factors that cannot be fully 
controlled for17.  
As a robustness check, thus, we address this concern by replicating the 
main estimations on a sub-sample of countries that are not members of the 
OECD. The results, reported in Tables 11-13, suggest that almost all the 
findings for the entire large sample are qualitatively valid also for the 
subsample of non-OECD countries: all the coefficients for the variables 
                                                 
17 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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capturing a dimension of the quality of institutions have the same sign and 
similar size. Unsurprisingly, given the lower number of observations, the 
reduced variability of the explanatory variables in the restricted sample of 
more homogeneous countries and the higher collinearity between 
independent variables in the subsample, a few coefficients appear not to be 
statistically significant. This notwithstanding, the overall explanatory 
power of the models remains satisfactory and the significance of the 
institutional variables is preserved. 
 
Table 11: Informality and Institution Extractiveness in Non-OECD Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP per capita -2.192 -2.130 -1.157 -2.015 -2.079 -2.104 -2.696 
 (2.253) (2.595) (3.024) (2.247) (2.258) (2.260) (2.324) 
Agriculture VA 3.199 3.490 3.725 3.067 3.152 3.133 3.293 
 (2.003) (2.159) (2.566) (2.003) (2.004) (2.005) (2.063) 
Population above 65 7.523*** 6.533** 4.495 5.655** 6.116** 6.498** 7.624*** 
 (2.749) (3.030) (3.717) (2.550) (2.461) (2.605) (2.782) 
Population in largest city 5.579*** 5.682*** 5.749** 5.361*** 5.495*** 5.467*** 5.583*** 
 (1.999) (2.146) (2.367) (1.986) (2.008) (1.991) (2.029) 
Fractionalization 10.96** 9.606* 7.871 9.253* 9.577* 9.944** 10.01** 
 (5.005) (5.436) (6.378) (4.871) (4.860) (4.978) (5.011) 
Protestants -0.021 -0.014 -0.065 -0.019 -0.023 -0.018 -0.004 
 (0.083) (0.090) (0.100) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.085) 
Executive constraints -0.490       
 (0.657)       
Military interference  -0.185      
  (0.557)      
Reliability of police   -1.367     
   (0.989)     
Democratic regime    1.576    
    (2.258)    
Age democracy     0.0190   
     (0.0833)   
Political rights      0.207  
      (0.637)  
Legal rights       -0.279 
       (0.510) 
Observations 90 81 68 91 91 91 89 
Adjusted-R2 .247 .186 .153 .241 .237 .238 .223 
Dep. variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 12: Informality and Institution Extractiveness in Non-OECD Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita -0.432 -1.503 -0.842 -3.682 
 (3.000) (2.417) (2.995) (2.346) 
Agriculture VA 3.959 2.125 3.269 2.890 
 (2.447) (2.131) (2.539) (1.961) 
Population above 65 3.664 4.616 4.175 8.686*** 
 (3.715) (2.988) (3.696) (2.681) 
Population in largest city 4.932** 5.337** 5.351** 5.701*** 
 (2.326) (2.057) (2.325) (1.947) 
Fractionalization 8.473 9.622* 8.261 9.723** 
 (6.304) (5.180) (6.315) (4.747) 
Protestants 0.012 0.026 -0.001 -0.018 
 (0.101) (0.085) (0.100) (0.080) 
Judicial independence -1.657**    
 (0.802)    
Impartiality of courts  -2.413**   
  (0.921)   
Property rights protection   -2.120**  
   (1.056)  
Rents from natural resources    0.128** 
    (0.0637) 
Observations 67 81 67 91 
Adjusted-R2 .182 .255 .179 .272 
Dep. variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 13: Informality, Burden of Regulation and Effectiveness/Efficiency of Institutions 
in Non-OECD Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GDP per capita -2.333 -1.291 -2.401 -0.879 -1.123 -2.698 -2.004 -2.753 
 (2.501) (3.105) (2.431) (3.090) (3.092) (2.253) (2.308) (2.322) 
Agriculture VA 3.402 4.706* 3.322 4.676* 4.394* 2.409 4.620** 3.216 
 (2.164) (2.505) (2.098) (2.507) (2.574) (2.048) (2.082) (2.063) 
Population above 65 6.410** 5.075 6.401** 5.115 4.676 5.863** 6.726** 7.741*** 
 (3.034) (3.914) (2.942) (3.852) (3.796) (2.684) (2.696) (2.766) 
Population in largest city 5.743*** 5.128** 4.943** 5.294** 5.472** 7.053*** 5.683*** 5.863*** 
 (2.143) (2.496) (2.114) (2.397) (2.413) (2.083) (2.049) (2.047) 
Fractionalization 9.504* 7.391 9.576* 8.834 8.325 8.911* 9.186* 9.281* 
 (5.432) (6.841) (5.258) (6.590) (6.503) (4.817) (4.960) (4.938) 
Protestants -0.016 -0.022 -0.033 -0.040 -0.044 -0.014 -0.044 -0.014 
 (0.088) (0.103) (0.084) (0.101) (0.101) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) 
Labor market regulations -0.453        
 (0.883)        
Hiring and firing regulations  0.600       
  (1.071)       
Cost worker dismissal  -0.0789       
  (0.496)       
Hours regulations  -0.915 -1.351**      
  (0.809) (0.635)      
Hiring regulations and min wage  -0.184       
  (0.498)       
Bureaucracy costs    -0.608     
    (1.067)     
Administrative burden     -0.851    
     (1.251)    
Time to pay taxes      3.856**   
      (1.793)   
Time to resolve insolvency       -4.739*  
       (2.713)  
Time to enforce a contract        1.926 
        (2.573) 
Observations 81 65 81 67 67 89 85 89 
Adjusted-R2 0.187 0.126 0.232 0.128 0.130 0.262 0.261 0.225 
Dep. variable: informal economy (% GDP). Constant not reported. s.e. in parentheses. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
6 Conclusions  
This work investigates whether and to what extent the extractiveness of 
formal institutions directly influences the size of informal economic 
activities. This important aspect of the actual functioning of the institutional 
framework has never been studied before in socio-economic literature on 
informality, notwithstanding the evidence in favor of its impact on other 
important aspects of the development process (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
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To test this hypothesis, we employ several variables proxying for their 
extractiveness as well as other distinct features. As we aim to cover a set of 
countries larger than the samples studied so far, we start by concentrating 
on indicators available for more than 90 countries and then consider 
additional estimations (accounting for various culture, trust and 
generalized morality) for a smaller group of about 50 countries. In the 
analysis we do not resort to broad institutional measures for the quality of 
institutions, such as the well-known and widely used World Governance 
Indicators, as such synthetic measures tend to subsume and average out 
very different institutional aspects we are instead interested in 
disentangling. 
Our empirical results suggest that institution extractiveness is a 
significant determinant of the size of the informal economy whereas, as 
found also in previous studies, only a limited number of variables proxying 
for the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions appear to impact on 
informality. While we find no evidence that cultural and religious traits do 
play a relevant impact, the attitude of people to consider as justifiable 
avoiding to pay the fare on public transports and cheating on taxes is 
correlated with the size of informal economy, thereby suggesting the 
existence of a relationship between informality and what people believe to 
owe to the public sector. 
In line with previous results, we also find that the greater the generalized 
trust the lower the extent of the informal economy. Neither particularized 
trust in the family, nor the sense of belonging to the local and national 
communities are significantly associated with informality. Notably, we find 
evidence that informality is associated with the lack of trust in various kinds 
of formal institutions and we believe that this reinforces our findings 
regarding the impact of the perceived extractiveness of institutions on 
informality. 
By showing the impact of the extractiveness of institutions, this work 
helps to explain why various countries exhibit low levels of informality 
notwithstanding very high taxation and stringent regulation: burdensome 
taxes and regulations, the reasoning goes, risk pushing agents into 
informality more in the presence of extractive than inclusive institutions. 
This is in line with the theoretical work by Acemoglu (2005), who identifies 
“consensually-strong State equilibria”, whereby a State is politically weak 
but manages to impose high taxes because a sufficient fraction of the 
proceeds is invested in public goods to the benefit of the population. 
This approach may also help to account for the fact, pointed out by 
Friedman et al. (2000), that tax rates and revenues exhibit a negative partial 
correlation with the share of the informal economy once some controls for 
the quality of institutions are introduced. That taxes and regulatory burdens 
are negatively correlated with the informal economy would otherwise 
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appear a counter-intuitive finding for those embracing a purely neoliberal 
approach (see, for instance, De Soto 1989), whereby individuals react to 
restrictive norms by moving as much activity as possible into the informal 
economy. In fact, this observed result is less surprising once the dichotomy 
between inclusive and extractive institutions is taken into consideration. 
Besides filling a gap in the socio-economic literature on informality, our 
findings pave the way to further analyses on smaller samples of countries 
or case studies with a view to investigating more directly the specific 
channels through which extractive institutions affect the decision to 
undertake informal activities. Finally, this study may inform future 
research on the relationship between extractive/inclusive institutions and 
specific types of informal economic activities (e.g., for profit vs. not for 
profit). 
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